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Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent

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  • Mich Tvede

    (Institute of Economics)

  • Hervé Crès

    (Département d'économie)

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    File URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/10282/resources/cres-tvede-crhec-2001.pdf
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    Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number 726/2001.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10282

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    1. Dierker, E. & Dierker, H. & Grodal, B., 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Papers 9902, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
    2. Hayne E. Leland, 1973. "Production Theory and the Stock Market," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 361, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 293-329, March.
    5. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
    6. Schofield, Norman, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 575-94, October.
    7. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    8. DeMarzo, Peter M, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 713-34, July.
    9. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    10. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    11. Alessandro Citanna & Antonio Villanacci, 2004. "Pooling and endogenous market incompleteness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 549-560, October.
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