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Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members

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Author Info
Pierre-Guillaume Méon () (DULBEA, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels)

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Abstract

This note studies the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members’ preferences are volatile, due to common and individual preferences shocks. It is shown that majority voting mitigates the latter but not the former. The volatility of the policy is smaller the smaller the volatility of members’ preferences, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller than if it was chosen by a single member. The results hold in a context of uncertainty and with multidimensional issues.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA) in its series Working Papers DULBEA with number 06-05.RS.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dul:wpaper:06-05rs

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Web page: http://www.dulbea.org
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Related research
Keywords: committee; majority voting; uncertainty; volatility;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Slutsky, Steven, 1977. "A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 299-325, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. McKelvey, Richard D. & Schofield, Norman, 1986. "Structural instability of the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 179-198, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Schofield, Norman, 1977. "Transitivity of preferences on a smooth manifold of alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 149-171, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  3. Charles Plaigin, 2009. "Exploratory study on the presence of cultural and institutional growth spillovers," Working Papers DULBEA 09-03.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
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