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Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets

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  • Mich Tvede

    (Institute of Economics)

  • Hervé Crès
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    Abstract

    An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the ¯rst date and a ¯nite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting { one share, one vote { and at ½-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ½ £ 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists provided that ½ ¸ min ½ S ¡ J S ¡ J + 1 ; B B + 1 ¾ where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of ¯rms and B is the dimensions of the sets of e±cient production plans for ¯rms. Moreover, an example shows that ½-majority stable equilibria need not exist for smaller ½'s.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number 722/2001.

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    Date of creation: 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10283

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    1. Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, 1995. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève 95.01, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
    2. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    3. Dreze, J.H., 1984. "(Uncertainty and) the firm in general equilibrium theory," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1984026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
    5. Shafer, Wayne & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1975. "Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 345-348, December.
    6. DeMarzo, Peter M, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 713-34, July.
    7. Radner, Roy, 1972. "Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 40(2), pages 289-303, March.
    8. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    9. CRES, Herve, 2000. "Majority stable production equilibria : a multivariate mean shareholders theorem," Les Cahiers de Recherche 706, HEC Paris.
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