Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets
AbstractAn economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting — one share, one vote — and at ?-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ? × 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a ?-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if ? = S - J S - J + 1 , where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that ?-majority stable stock market equilibrianeed not exist for smaller ?’s.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 04-09.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crés, 2005. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 887-906, November.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," Les Cahiers de Recherche 722, HEC Paris.
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2004-06-02 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-06-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2004-06-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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