Incomplete Markets and the Firm
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Drèze equilibria for economies with incomplete markets and firms. The well known fact that a Drèze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto optimal is often attributed to a lack of coordination between firms. We show that there are economies with a single firm in which no Drèze equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient. Even a unique Drèze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carleton - School of Public Administration in its series Papers with number 99-03.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
ENTERPRISES ; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM;
Other versions of this item:
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Dierker, E. & Dierker, H. & Grodal, B., 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Papers 9902, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
- Egbert DIERKER & Hildegard DIERKER & Birgit GRODAL, 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Vienna Economics Papers vie9902, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Discussion Papers 99-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
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- CRES, Herve, 2000. "Majority stable production equilibria : a multivariate mean shareholders theorem," Les Cahiers de Recherche 706, HEC Paris.
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Oussama Lachiri, 2004. "A note on the Drèze’s criterion for large capitalist firms," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04120, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Mario Tirelli, 2003.
"Income taxation when markets are incomplete,"
Decisions in Economics and Finance,
Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 97-128, November.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Sciences Po publications 726/2001, Sciences Po.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2000.
"Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria when Markets are Incomplete,"
CIE Discussion Papers
2000-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2002. "Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1245-1251, May.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2001. "Nonexistence of constrained Efficient Equilibria when Markets are Incomplete," Vienna Economics Papers 0111, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Sciences Po publications 706/2000, Sciences Po.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Les Cahiers de Recherche 726, HEC Paris.
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