In this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Dreze equilibria for economies with incomplete markets and firms. The well known fact that a Dreze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto Optimal is often attributed to a lack of coordination between firms. We show that there are economies with a single firm in which no Dreze is constrained pareto efficient. Even a unique Dreze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto efficient.
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Paper provided by Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy in its series Papers with number
9902.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
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