Production externalities: internalization by voting
AbstractWe study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 53 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
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