We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders' interests. We show that the efficiency of the limit allocation depends on how firms' shares are distributed across consumers, and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
17677.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
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