Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability
AbstractIn the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to – through self-fulfilling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number info:hdl:2441/10267.
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, vol. 45, pp.212-222
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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