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Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models

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  • Hervé Crès

    (Sciences Po, Paris, herve.cres@sciences-po.fr)

  • M. Utku Ãœnver

    (Boston College, utku.unver@bc.edu,)

Abstract

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the ‘worst-case’ scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 — 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by in its journal Journal of Theoretical Politics.

Volume (Year): 22 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 431-444

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Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:4:p:431-444

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Keywords: ideology; mean voter theorem; spatial voting; super majority;

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  1. Ferejohn, John A. & Grether, David M., . "On a Class of Rational Social Decision Procedures," Working Papers 25, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 938, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  4. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2009. "Production in Incomplete Markets: Expectations Matter for Political Stability," Discussion Papers 09-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2006. "Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting," Les Cahiers de Recherche 816, HEC Paris.
  6. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
  7. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
  8. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
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