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Structural Instability of the Core

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  • McKelvey, R. D.
  • Schofield, N.

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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 535.

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Date of creation: Nov 1984
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Publication status: Published:
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:535

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Cited by:
  1. Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 207-216, September.
  2. Norman Schofield, 2005. "The intellectual contribution of Condorcet to the founding of the US Republic 1785–1800," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 303-318, December.
  3. John Jackson, 2014. "Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 197-218, April.
  4. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
  5. Tataru, Maria, 1999. "Growth rates in multidimensional spatial voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 253-263, May.
  6. Donald Saari & Garrett Asay, 2010. "Finessing a point: augmenting the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 121-143, January.
  7. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2011. "A survival analysis of the circulation of the political elites governing Italy from 1861 to 1994," Working Papers 141, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  8. Currarini, Sergio, 2002. "Voting on public goods in multi-jurisdictional systems," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 215-230, June.
  9. Norman Schofield, 2007. "Modelling Politics," ICER Working Papers 33-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  10. Paulo Pereira, 2000. "From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-86, March.
  11. Norman Schofield & Robert P. Parks, 1993. "EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A SPATIAL MODEL OF n-PARTY COMPETITION," Public Economics 9308002, EconWPA, revised 25 Aug 1993.

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