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Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Firm under Uncertainty

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Author Info
Simon Benninga
Eitan Muller
Abstract

A set of production vectors is said to fulfill the "current spanning" condition if any firm's current production vector is spanned by the rest of the market. Our major theorem shows that, given current spanning, a production plan may be found which will always win the approval of a majority of the firm's initial shareholders. Furthermore, these shareholders are shown to be the only ones concerned with the firm's production plans. Finally, we show that an equilibrium exists in which all firms choose plans approved by a majority of their shareholders.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1979)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 670-682
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:10:y:1979:i:autumn:p:670-682

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  1. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. CRES, Hervé & TVEDE, Mich, 2004. "The Dreze and Grossman-Hart criteria for production in incomplete markets: Voting foundations and compared political stability," Les Cahiers de Recherche 794, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hervé Crès, 2006. "A Geometric Study of Shareholders’ Voting in Incomplete Markets: Multivariate Median and Mean Shareholder Theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 377-406, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2006. "Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting," Les Cahiers de Recherche 816, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

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