Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models
AbstractWhen aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the "worst-case" scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper the authors assume that a lower d-dimensional (d
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 818.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 06 Feb 2006
Date of revision:
spatial voting; super majority; ideology; mean voter theorem; random point set;
Other versions of this item:
- HervÃ© CrÃ¨s & M. Utku Ãœnver, 2010. "Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 431-444, October.
- M.Utku Unver, 2005. "Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Working Papers 261, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005.
- Hervé Crès & Utku Unver, 2010. "Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
- Herve Cres & M. Utku Unver, 2005. "Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," Microeconomics 0506007, EconWPA.
- Hervé Crès & M. Utku Ünver, 2008. "Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 716, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Utku Unver & Hervé Crès, 2005. "Ideology and existence of 50% : Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," Sciences Po publications 818/2005, Sciences Po.
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-02-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2006-02-12 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2006-02-12 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-02-12 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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