This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Crès, Hervé ()
Ünver, Utku

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the "worst-case" scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper the authors assume that a lower d-dimensional (d
Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hec.fr/hec/fr/professeurs_recherche/upload/cahiers/CR818.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Groupe HEC in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 818.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 06 Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0818

Contact details of provider:
Postal: HEC Business School, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France
Web page: http://www.hec.fr/hec/eng/index.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Sandra Dupouy).

Related research
Keywords: spatial voting super majority ideology mean voter theorem random point set

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2006. "Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting," Les Cahiers de Recherche 816, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  3. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.