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Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting

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Author Info
Sadanand, Asha B
Williamson, John M

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates the existence of a shareholders' equilibrium for a two-period stock-market economy in which there may be fewer securities than states of the world. There are two allocation mechanisms in the economy: firms' owners may vote (direction restricted majority rule) to change firms' production plans across states while keeping shareholdings fixed, and individuals may trade their shares and stocks of a current production/consumption good while keeping firms' plans fixed. A shareholders' equilibrium is a set of firms' plans, and an allocation of shares and the current good which are stable with respect to both mechanisms. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%28199102%2932%3A1%3C1%3AEIASME%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 32 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 1-35
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:32:y:1991:i:1:p:1-35

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  1. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2009. "Production in Incomplete Markets: Expectations Matter for Political Stability," Discussion Papers 09-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Industrial Organization 0204001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. CRES, Hervé & TVEDE, Mich, 2004. "The Dreze and Grossman-Hart criteria for production in incomplete markets: Voting foundations and compared political stability," Les Cahiers de Recherche 794, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
  5. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2006. "Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting," Les Cahiers de Recherche 816, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
  6. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Working Papers 1079, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2005. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Microeconomics 0509003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Hervé Crès, 2006. "A Geometric Study of Shareholders’ Voting in Incomplete Markets: Multivariate Median and Mean Shareholder Theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 377-406, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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