Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility
AbstractWe consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single ¯rm and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the ini- tially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and transparent framework, the objective of a firm can be defined as the max- imization of the total utility of its control group C measured in units of good 0. We analyze how the size and the composition of C influences the rm's market behavior and state conditions under which the firm sells its output at prices which are at, above, or below marginal costs, respectively. We discuss the assumption of competitive price perceptions and point out important differences between the concepts of a Dreze and of a Grossman- Hart equilibrium that occur in spite of the close similarity of the formulas which define them.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 1106.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
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- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
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