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A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market

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  • Stefano Demichelis

    ()

  • Klaus Ritzberger

    ()

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 46 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 221-254

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:46:y:2011:i:2:p:221-254

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Related research

Keywords: Corporate governance; General equilibrium; Objective function of the firm; Shareholder voting; Stock markets; D21; D43; D51; G32; G34;

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References

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  1. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2002. "Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1245-1251, May.
  2. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1978. "A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies," Special Studies Papers 115, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-48.
  4. Rafael La porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, 06.
  5. Egbert Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1994. "Profit Maximization Mitigates Competition," Discussion Papers 94-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Camelia Bejan, 2008. "The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 99-118, October.
  7. Ritzberger, Klaus, 2005. "Shareholder voting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 69-72, January.
  8. Victor Dorofeenko & Larry Lang & Klaus Ritzberger & Jamsheed Shorish, 2008. "Who controls Allianz?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 75-103, January.
  9. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2002. "Are Incomplete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency?," Discussion Papers 03-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  10. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2008. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(6), pages 1115-1141, December.
  11. Egbert Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1996. "The Price Normalization Problem in Imperfect Competition and the Objective of the Firm," Discussion Papers 96-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  12. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean & Vial, Jean-Philippe, 1972. "Oligopoly "A la cournot" in a general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 381-400, June.
  13. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000536, David K. Levine.
  14. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
  15. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
  16. Nenova, Tatiana, 2003. "The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 325-351, June.
  17. DeMarzo, Peter M, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 713-34, July.
  18. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1448-1471, December.
  19. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000536, www.najecon.org.
  21. Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, 1988. "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 89-110.
  22. Rydqvist, Kristian, 1996. "Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1407-1425, September.
  23. Bejan, Camelia, 2008. "Production and financial decisions under uncertainty," MPRA Paper 11033, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328.
  25. Holger M. Müller & Fausto Panunzi, 2004. "Tender Offers and Leverage," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1217-1248, November.
  26. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 473-94, July.
  27. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker, 2006. "General Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 436-445, 04-05.
  28. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1998. "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 172-204, February.
  29. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January.
  30. Hirshleifer, David & Titman, Sheridan, 1990. "Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 295-324, April.
  31. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker, 2010. "Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 55-63, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
  2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Giorgio Rampa & Francesco Bogliacino, 2012. "Expectational Bottlenecks and the Emerging of New Organizational Forms," Quaderni di Dipartimento 159, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods.
  4. Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2013. "A bargaining theory of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 45-75, September.

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