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The Puzzle of Dual Class Stock in Russia. Explaining the Price Differential between Common and Preferred Shares

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Author Info
Muravyev Alexander ()

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Abstract

This paper attempts to explain a large premium paid on common (voting) shares relative to preferred (non-voting) shares in the Russian stock market. Empirical analysis focuses on two main explanations relating the premium either to the voting right attached to common shares or to differences in liquidity between the two classes of stock. Two avenues through which the right to vote may give rise to the premium are distinguished. First, the presence of private benefits of control and the possibility of control contests may make the votes held by small investors pivotal, and therefore valuable. Second, non-voting shareholders may be expropriated as a class by voting shareholders. Case studies and regression analysis of RTS stock exchange data from 1997-2003 provide support for the control contest model of the premium as well as for the liquidity argument. The study finds no evidence that the premium is related to expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 04-07e.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 23 Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:04-07e

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Related research
Keywords: Russia dual-class stock voting premium ownership structure corporate governance

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  3. Zingales, Luigi, 1995. "What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1047-73, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  10. Nicodano, Giovanna, 1998. "Corporate groups, dual-class shares and the value of voting rights," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(9), pages 1117-1137, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rydqvist, Kristian, 1996. "Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1407-1425, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Amihud, Yakov & Mendelson, Haim, 1986. "Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 223-249, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-48. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2002. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," CEPR Discussion Papers 3177, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Nenova, Tatiana, 2003. "The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 325-351, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Chung, Kee H. & Kim, Jeong-Kuk, 1999. "Corporate ownership and the value of a vote in an emerging market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 35-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  19. D Willer, 1997. "Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights in Russia," CEP Discussion Papers 0343, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  20. Leech, Dennis, 1985. "The relationshiop between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies : A study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 267, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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    Other versions:
  22. Rydqvist, Kristian, 1992. "Dual-Class Shares: A Review," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 45-57, Autumn.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alexander Muravyev, 2007. "Dual Class Stock in Russia : What Explains the Price Differential between Common and Preferred Shares?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 680, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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