The relationshiop between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies : A study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games
AbstractThe relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power and the question of corporate control has long been recognised as being of central importance in the economies of the firm and has given rise to a large literature. Despite this, however, and the fact that quite sharp differences in perspective exist in this literature, relatively little work has been done on actually attempting to measure, in a theoretically rigorous way, the quantitative significance of empirically observed differences in concentration on the distribution of power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 267.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: 1985
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Dennis Leech, 1988. "The Relationship Between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 509-527, April.
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