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Kursunterschiede und Renditen deutscher Stamm- und Vorzugsaktien

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  • Daske, Stefan
  • Ehrhardt, Olaf
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    Abstract

    In der vorliegenden Untersuchung betrachten wir die Grundgesamtheit der deutschen Unternehmen, von denen im Zeitraum 1956 bis 1998 Stamm- und stimmrechtslose Vorzugsaktien börsennotiert waren. Zwischen beiden Aktiengattungen besteht mit durchschnittlich 17,2 Prozentpunkten ein ökonomisch und statistisch signifikanter Kursunterschied, und zwar für alle Marktsegmente und betrachteten Teilperioden. Der durchschnittliche Kursunterschied unterliegt im Zeitablauf aber starken Schwankungen, die in hohem Maße mit einer Veränderung des Anteils von Familienunternehmen korrelieren und damit mit der Höhe privater Kontrollrenten in Verbindung stehen. Unternehmensspezifische Unterschiede in der Höhe des Kursaufschlages sind nach unseren Ergebnissen außerdem mit unterschiedlichen Konzentrationen des Anteilsbesitzes verbunden. Positive Stimmrechtsprämien am deutschen Markt können trotz nahezu fehlender feindlicher Übernahmen auch durch mögliche Koalitionsbildungen zur Ausübung von Vetorechten erklärt werden. Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen ferner, dass sich die Aktienrenditen für Stamm- und Vorzugsaktien haltende Minderheitsaktionäre nicht signifikant unterscheiden; der tatsächliche Dividendenvorteil der Vorzugsaktien ist relativ gering. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes in its series SFB 373 Discussion Papers with number 2002,5.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:20025

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    Cited by:
    1. Dittmann, Ingolf, 2004. "Block Trading, Ownership Structure, and the Value of Corporate Votes," Papers, Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE) 2004,13, Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE).

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