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The Role of Hostile Stakes in German Corporate Governance

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Author Info
Tim Jenkinson
Alexander Ljungqvist

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Abstract

This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The paper also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes.

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Paper provided by Oxford Financial Research Centre in its series OFRC Working Papers Series with number 1999fe02.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:1999fe02

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barclay, Michael J & Holderness, Clifford G, 1992. "The Law and Large-Block Trades," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 265-94, October.
  2. Allen B. Frankel & David E. Palmer, 1996. "The management of financial risks at German nonfinancial firms: the case of Metallgesellschaft," International Finance Discussion Papers 560, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Wenger, E & Kaserer, C, 1997. "The German System of Corporate Governance - A Model Which Should Not Be Imitated," Papers 14, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies-.
  5. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1995. " What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1421-60, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Roe, Mark J., 1990. "Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 7-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Denis, David J. & Serrano, Jan M., 1996. "Active investors and management turnover following unsuccessful control contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 239-266, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1985. "Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 555-555, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Dewatripont, M., 1993. "The 'leading shareholder' strategy, takeover contests and stock price dynamics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 983-1004, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Steven N Kaplan, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0045, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG.
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  13. Grundfest, Joseph A., 1990. "Subordination of American capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 89-114, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Choi, Dosoung, 1991. "Toehold Acquisitions, Shareholder Wealth, and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(03), pages 391-407, September. [Downloadable!]
  15. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Ruback, Richard S., 1985. "An empirical analysis of the interfirm equity investment process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 523-553, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jennifer E. Bethel & Julia Porter Liebeskind & Tim Opler, 1998. "Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 605-634, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. G. William Schwert, 2000. "Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2599-2640, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 842-52, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Spencer, Carolyn & Akhigbe, Aigbe & Madura, Jeff, 1998. "Impact of partial control on policies enacted by partial targets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 425-445, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Jensen, Michael C, 1993. " The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 831-80, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Barclay, Michael J & Holderness, Clifford G, 1991. " Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 861-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Smith, Michael P, 1996. " Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence for CalPERS," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 227-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1994. "A Welfare Comparison of the German and U.S. Financial Systems," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 94-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  25. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1998. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-25, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  26. Bergström, Clas & Högfeldt, Peter & Högholm, Kenneth, 1994. "Tests of a New Theory of Strategic Blocking by Large Shareholders and Arbitrageurs in Takeovers," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 31, Stockholm School of Economics.
  27. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Wruck, Karen Hopper, 1989. "Equity ownership concentration and firm value : Evidence from private equity financings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 3-28, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Manjon-Antolin, M.C., 2004. "Econometric modelling in blockholder systems of corporate governance," Discussion Paper 74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2003. "Ownership: Evolution and Regulation," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe14, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  3. Manjon, M.C., 2003. "The trade-off between risk and control in corporate ownership," Discussion Paper 81, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marc Goergen & Miguel Manjon & Luc Renneboog, 2008. "Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 37-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The managerial labor market and the governance role of shareholder control structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Robert S. Chirinko & Julie Ann Elston, 2004. "Finance, Control, And Profitability: The Influence Of German Banks," Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy 2004-26, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Andreas Hackethal & Reinhard H. Schmidt & Marcel Tyrell, 2005. "Banks and German Corporate Governance: On the Way to a Capital Market-Based System?," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 146, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ettore Andreani, 2003. "Corporate Control and the Financial System in Germany: Recent Changes in the Role of Banks," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 37, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Frank A. Schmid & Mark Wahrenburg, 2002. "Mergers and acquisitions in Germany," Working Papers 2002-027, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
  10. Köke, Jens, 2001. "Determinants of acquisition and failure : stylized facts and lessons for empirical studies," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-30, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Frank A. Schmid & Mark Wahrenburg, 2003. "Mergers and Acquisitions in Germany - Social Setting and Regulatory Framework," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/28, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
  12. S. Daske & O. Ehrhardt, . "Kursunterschiede und Renditen deutscher Stamm-und Vorzugsaktien," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2002-5, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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