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Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument

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  • Bo Becker
  • Henrik Cronqvist
  • Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

Abstract

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we develop an instrument – the density of wealthy individuals near a firm’s headquarters – for the presence of a large, non-managerial individual shareholder in a firm. These shareholders have a large impact on firms, controlling for selection effects.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17393.

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Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Publication status: published as Becker, Bo & Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2011. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(04), pages 907-942, September.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17393

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