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Blockholder Scarcity, Takeovers, and Ownership Structures

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  • Gorton, Gary
  • Kahl, Matthias

Abstract

Agency problems in firms are prevalent because of a scarcity of wealthy principals with corporate governance ability, whom we call “restructuring specialists.†We investigate how this scarce resource, “agency cost-free capital,†is allocated. We show that the restructuring specialists may acquire blocks only in those states of the worls in which they can increase firm value the most, which corresponds to a takeover. Firms with dispersed ownership and firms with a financial intermediary as a blockholder can coexist, although they are otherwise identical. The moderl can explain differences in corporate ownership structures and restructuring mechanisms across economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Gorton, Gary & Kahl, Matthias, 2008. "Blockholder Scarcity, Takeovers, and Ownership Structures," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 937-974, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:43:y:2008:i:04:p:937-974_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Becker, Bo & Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2011. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 907-942, August.
    2. Hui Zhang & Khine Kyaw, 2017. "Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Companies," Applied Economics and Finance, Redfame publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 57-64, March.
    3. Nakabayashi, Masaki, 2019. "Ownership structure and market efficiency," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 189-212.

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