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Equity block transfers in transition economies: Evidence from Poland

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  • Trojanowski, Grzegorz
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    Abstract

    This paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of equity block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be remarkably low and comparable with those for the most developed economies. Shareholders expect to benefit from intensified monitoring and from corporate restructuring resulting from block acquisitions. Still, shareholders are wary of expropriation stemming from the extraction of private benefits of control by block holders. The opportunities to extract such benefits depend on relative power of investors.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Systems.

    Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 217-238

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:32:y:2008:i:3:p:217-238

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    References

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    Cited by:
    1. Grosfeld, Irena, 2009. "Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 259-277, September.
    2. Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Takeovers under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium," Working Papers w0185, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00587856 is not listed on IDEAS

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