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A survey of blockholders and corporate control

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Author Info
Clifford G. Holderness
Abstract

The author surveys the empirical literature on large-percentage shareholders in public corporations, focusing on four key issues: the prevalence of blockholders; the motivation for block ownership; the effect of blockholders on executive compensation, leverage, the incidence of takeovers, and a wide range of corporate decisions; and the effect of blockholders on firm value. A central finding of this study is that there is little reason for policymakers or small investors to fear large-percentage shareholders in general, especially when the blockholders are active in firm management.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its journal Economic Policy Review.

Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): Apr ()
Pages: 51-64
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2003:i:apr:p:51-64:n:v.9no.1

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Related research
Keywords: Stockholders ; Corporate governance;

Cited by:
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  1. Lieven Baert & Rudi Vander Vennet, 2009. "Bank Ownership, Firm Value and Firm Capital Structure in Europe," Working Paper / FINESS 2.2, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Luis H. Gutiérrez & Carlos Pombo, 2005. "Corporate Valuation and Governance: Evidence from Colombia," RES Working Papers 3216, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Manjon-Antolin, M.C., 2004. "Econometric modelling in blockholder systems of corporate governance," Discussion Paper 74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Carlos Pombo & Luis H. Gutiérrez, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation in Colombia," RES Working Papers 4470, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Pursey Heugens & Marc Essen & J. Oosterhout, 2009. "Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 481-512, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Carlos Pombo & Luis H. Gutiérrez, 2007. "Gestión empresarial y valuación de empresas en Colombia," RES Working Papers 4471, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  7. Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2007. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies," SIFR Research Report Series 60, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Julio Segura, 2004. "Competencia, disciplina de mercado y regulación en presencia de conflictos de interés en las empresas," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 169(2), pages 135-170, June. [Downloadable!]
  9. Luis H. Gutiérrez & Carlos Pombo, 2005. "Valuación y gobierno corporativo: elementos de juicio de Colombia," RES Working Papers 3217, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  10. John S. Earle & Csaba Kucsera & Almos Telegdy, 2003. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Goulash?," Staff Working Papers 03-93, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Leonard Lundstrum, 2009. "Entrenched management, capital structure changes and firm value," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 161-175, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Alfonsina Iona & Leone Leonida & Aydin Ozkan, . "Determinants of Financial Conservatism: Evidence from Low-Leverage and Cash-Rich UK Firms," Discussion Papers 04/01, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  13. Berkman, Henk & Cole, Rebel & Fu , Lawrence, 2007. "Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder: Evidence from China," MPRA Paper 8088, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Angela Maddaloni & Darren Pain, 2004. "Corporate ‘excesses’ and financial market dynamics," Occasional Paper Series 17, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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