We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a unionized workforce. We develop a simple efficiency wage model, with a tradeoff between higher wages for workers and more monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a variety of data sets, we examine the implications of the model for the relationship between the employment and wages of managers and unionization. We find several results generally consistent with our model. (1) Both a higher fraction of unionization in an industry and region and a higher union wage differential are associated with fewer managers. (2) Managers' wages are about 5 to 7 percent lower in unionized firms. (3) For CEOs the effects are larger: a 10 percent increase in unionization reduces the pay of CEOs by 2.5 percent or more.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
2418.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Blanchflower, David G & Millward, Neil & Oswald, Andrew J, 1991.
"Unionism and Employment Behaviour,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 815-34, July.
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