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Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work

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  • Pierre André Chiappori
  • Bernard Salanié

Abstract

While the theoretical literature on contracts has been enormous since the seventies, empirical tests of the theory have long remained scarce. However, new empirical work has been developed in the last ten years that sheds light on the empirical validation of the theory. This paper aims at surveying the recent empirical work on contracts. The focus throughout is on the need to properly account for unobserved heterogeneity.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 738.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_738

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