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Competencia, disciplina de mercado y regulación en presencia de conflictos de interés en las empresas

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Author Info

  • Julio Segura

    ()
    (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

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    Abstract

    Este trabajo revisa los fundamentos analíticos y la evidencia empírica de los problemas básicos relacionados con el gobierno de las empresas, las normas contables y la transparencia y analiza el comportamiento de las empresas auditoras, los analistas y las agencias de calificación en la reciente crisis. En el artículo se discute la función de las instituciones reguladoras en este campo y se evalúan las propuestas y reformas llevadas a cabo en España y otros países en los últimos años.

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    File URL: http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/revistas/hac_pub/169_Competencia.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública.

    Volume (Year): 169 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 135-170

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    Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2004:v:169:i:2:p:135-170

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    Related research

    Keywords: Gobierno de las empresas; reglas contables; regulación financiera; conflictos de interés;

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    1. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1991. "Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem," Working Paper 9118, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    2. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    8. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
    9. repec:fth:prinin:431 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Working Paper 19443, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    11. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do," NBER Working Papers 7604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    13. Terence Lim, 2001. "Rationality and Analysts' Forecast Bias," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 369-385, 02.
    14. Paul A. Gompers & Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," NBER Working Papers 8449, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 2003. "Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 313-351, 02.
    16. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
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