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Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument

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  • Bo Becker

    (Harvard Business School, Finance Unit)

  • Henrik Cronqvist

    (Claremont McKenna College, Robert Day School of Economics and Finance)

  • Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

    (Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business and Ecole polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)

Abstract

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we develop an instrument - the density of wealthy individuals near a firm's headquarters - for the presence of large, non-managerial individual shareholders in firms. These shareholders have a large impact on firms, controlling for selection effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Bo Becker & Henrik Cronqvist & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2009. "Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument," Harvard Business School Working Papers 10-028, Harvard Business School, revised Feb 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:10-028
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    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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