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One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence

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  • Renée Adams
  • Daniel Ferreira
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    Abstract

    We survey the empirical literature on disproportional ownership, i.e. the use of mechanisms that separate voting rights from cash flow rights in corporations. Our focus is mostly on explicit mechanisms that allow some shareholders to acquire control with less than proportional economic interest in the firm (dual-class equity structures, stock pyramids, cross-ownership, etc.), but we also briefly discuss other mechanisms, such as takeover defenses and fiduciary voting. We provide a broad overview of different areas in this literature and highlight problems of interpretation that may arise because of empirical difficulties. We outline potentially promising areas for future research. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by European Finance Association in its journal Review of Finance.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 51-91

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:12:y:2008:i:1:p:51-91

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    Cited by:
    1. Lauterbach, Beni & Yafeh, Yishay, 2009. "Long Term Changes in Voting Power and Control Structure following the Unification of Dual Class Shares," CEPR Discussion Papers 7287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Lauterbach, Beni & Yafeh, Yishay, 2011. "Long term changes in voting power and control structure following the unification of dual class shares," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 215-228, April.
    3. Samuel Lee & Christian At & Mike Burkart, 2007. "Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening," FMG Discussion Papers dp575, Financial Markets Group.
    4. Jin-Hui Luo & Heng Liu, 2014. "Family-Concentrated Ownership in Chinese PLCs: Does Ownership Concentration Always Enhance Corporate Value?," International Journal of Financial Studies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 103-121, February.
    5. Bennedsen, Morten & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2010. "Incentive and entrenchment effects in European ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 2212-2229, September.
    6. Poulsen, Thomas, 2012. "Disentangling disproportionality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 743-745.
    7. Bigelli, Marco & Croci, Ettore, 2013. "Dividend privileges and the value of voting rights: Evidence from Italy," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 94-107.
    8. Muravyev, Alexander, 2009. "Investor protection and share prices: Evidence from statutory rules governing variations of shareholders’ class rights in Russia," MPRA Paper 13678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Claessens, Stijn & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2013. "Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-33.
    10. Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2009. "The diversification cost of large, concentrated equity stakes. How big is it? Is it justified?," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/22, University of Stavanger.
    11. Arugaslan, Onur & Cook, Douglas O. & Kieschnick, Robert, 2010. "On the decision to go public with dual class stock," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 170-181, April.
    12. Larrain, Borja & Urzúa I., Francisco, 2013. "Controlling shareholders and market timing in share issuance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 661-681.
    13. Eklund, Johan E, 2009. "One Share – One Vote: new evidence from the Nordic countries," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 168, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    14. Munisi, Gibson & Randøy, Trond, 2013. "Corporate governance and company performance across Sub-Saharan African countries," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 92-110.
    15. Jin-hui Luo & Di-fang Wan & Di Cai, 2012. "The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow rights always reduce controlling shareholders’ tunneling?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 499-518, June.
    16. Yishay Yafeh & Beni Lauterbach, 2009. "Long Term Changes in Voting Power and Control Structure following the Unification of Dual Class Shares," Working Papers 2009.112, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    17. Poulsen, Thomas, 2011. "Private benefits in corporate control transactions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 52-58, January.
    18. Hamon, Jacques & Ginglinger, Edith, 2012. "Ownership, control and market liquidity," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/9676, Paris Dauphine University.
    19. Di Cai & Jin-hui Luo & Di-fang Wan, 2012. "Family CEOs: Do they benefit firm performance in China?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 923-947, December.
    20. Ferreira, Daniel & Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L., 2007. "Unbundling Ownership and Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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