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Restricted Voting Shares, Ownership Structure, And The Market Value Of Dual-Class Firms

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  • James S. Ang
  • William L Megginson

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  • James S. Ang & William L Megginson, 1989. "Restricted Voting Shares, Ownership Structure, And The Market Value Of Dual-Class Firms," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 12(4), pages 301-318, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:12:y:1989:i:4:p:301-318
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1989.tb00524.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    2. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    3. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    4. Lease, Ronald C. & McConnell, John J. & Mikkelson, Wayne H., 1983. "The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 439-471, April.
    5. Easterbrook, Frank H & Fischel, Daniel R, 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 395-427, June.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Lease, Ronald C & McConnell, John J & Mikkelson, Wayne H, 1984. "The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 443-467, October.
    8. Brown, Stephen J. & Warner, Jerold B., 1980. "Measuring security price performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 205-258, September.
    9. Jarrell, Gregg A. & Poulsen, Annette B., 1988. "Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms : The recent evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 129-152, January.
    10. Partch, M. Megan, 1987. "The creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 313-339, June.
    11. Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, 1984. "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 54-68, Spring.
    12. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    13. Ruback, Richard S., 1988. "Coercive dual-class exchange offers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 153-173, January.
    14. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January.
    15. Levy, Haim, 1983. "Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 79-93, March.
    16. Downes, David H & Heinkel, Robert, 1982. "Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 1-10, March.
    17. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1985. "Managerial ownership of voting rights : A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 33-69, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Betzer, André & van den Bongard, Inga & Goergen, Marc, 2017. "Index membership vs. loss of voting power: The unification of dual-class shares," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 140-153.
    2. Bigelli, Marco & Mehrotra, Vikas & Rau, P. Raghavendra, 2011. "Why are shareholders not paid to give up their voting privileges? Unique evidence from Italy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1619-1635.
    3. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    4. Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2008. "One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 51-91.
    5. Bigelli, Marco & Croci, Ettore, 2013. "Dividend privileges and the value of voting rights: Evidence from Italy," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 94-107.
    6. Chung, Kee H. & Kim, Jeong-Kuk, 1999. "Corporate ownership and the value of a vote in an emerging market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 35-54, March.
    7. Odegaard, Bernt Arne, 2007. "Price differences between equity classes. Corporate control, foreign ownership or liquidity?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3621-3645, December.
    8. Teall, John L., 1997. "The one-share-one-vote-rule and managerial compensation," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 211-223.
    9. Braggion, Fabio & Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2019. "Changing corporate governance norms: Evidence from dual class shares in the UK," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 15-27.
    10. Dittmann, Ingolf, 2004. "Block Trading, Ownership Structure, and the Value of Corporate Votes," Papers 2004,13, Humboldt University of Berlin, Center for Applied Statistics and Economics (CASE).
    11. John L. Teall, 1997. "The one‐share‐one‐vote‐rule and managerial compensation," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 211-223.
    12. Amoako-Adu, Ben & Smith, Brian F., 2001. "Dual class firms: Capitalization, ownership structure and recapitalization back into single class," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1083-1111, June.
    13. Ling T. He & K. Michael Casey, 2011. "On The Pricing Of Dual Class Stocks: Evidence From Berkshire Hathaway," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 5(1), pages 103-112.

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