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Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Analysis Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Randall Morck
Andrei Shleifer
Robert W. Vishny
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We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms, Tobin's Q first increases and then declines as board of directors holdings rise. For older firms there is weak evidence that Q is lower when a firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
2055.
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Date of creation: Oct 1986Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2055Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
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Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, 2003.
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"Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives ,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Bennedsen, Morten & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner & Nielsen, Thomas Vester, 2008.
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Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Nielsen, 2005.
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