Profit Maximization Mitigates Competition
AbstractWe consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders' utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise proces, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number vie9405.
Date of creation: Oct 1994
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Publication status: published in Economic Theory, 7 (1996), 139-160.
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- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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