Endogenous Firm Objectives
AbstractWe analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decision are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. However, when they do, and there are no short-selling constraints the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short- selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0204001.
Date of creation: 15 Apr 2002
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Imperfect Competition; Shareholder Voting; Politico Economic Equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-06-13 (All new papers)
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