Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?

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Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?

Author Info

Roemer, J.E.

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John Roemer

Abstract

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Paper provided by California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs in its series Papers with number 376.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1991
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Handle: RePEc:fth:caldav:376

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, RESEARCH PROGRAM IN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS AND MACRO POLICY, DAVIS CALIFORNIA 95616 U.S.A.

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Article
- Roemer, John E, 1993. " Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 95(2), pages 227-38.

Cited by:
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Christopher J. Ellis & Anne van den Nouweland, 2000. "A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2000-2, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Industrial Organization 0204001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, . "Endogeneous Firm Objectives," Wallis Working Papers WP27, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
- Renstrom, T.I. & Yalcin, E., 1996. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Discussion Papers 96-05, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Renström, Thomas I & Yalcin, Erkan, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Takeovers and Cooperatives," Working Papers 1113, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Giacomo Corneo, 2005. "Media Capture in a Democracy: The Role of Wealth Concentration," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
James A. Yunker, 2003. "Capital Wealth Inequality and Public Bads: A Mathematical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 105-119, Winter. [Downloadable!]
Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2005. "Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm," Working Papers 1078, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2006. "Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 565-589, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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