Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?
AbstractThe general argument of those who believe that economic democracy decreases the amount of public bads is that, with economic democracy, 'the people' would make decisions rather than a small class of capitalists. An attempt is made to evaluate and analyze this argument. Several possibilities emerge and the situation is found to be more subtle than implied by this popular argument. Copyright 1993 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 95 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442
Other versions of this item:
- Roemer, J.E., 1991. "Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?," Papers 376, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
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