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Endogenous Firm Objectives

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  • Renström, Thomas I
  • Yalcin, Erdal

Abstract

We analyse the behaviour of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm?s decision are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any initial distribution of shares is an equilibrium, if individuals do not recognize their influence on voting when trading shares. When they do, however, and there are no short-selling constraints the only equilibrium is the efficient one. With short-selling constraints typically underproduction occurs. It is not market power itself causing underproduction, but the inability to perfectly trade the rights to market power.

Suggested Citation

  • Renström, Thomas I & Yalcin, Erdal, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3361
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2006. "Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 565-589, November.
    2. Dirk Willenbockel, 2005. "The Price Normalisation Problem in General Equilibriun Models with Oligopoly Power: An Attempt at Perspective," GE, Growth, Math methods 0505002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imperfect competition; Shareholder voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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