This paper provides a theory of general equilibrium with externalities and/or monopoly. We assume that the firm's decisions are based on the preferences of shareholders and/or other stakeholders. Under these assumptions, a firmrm will produce fewer negative externalities than the comparable profit maximizing firm. In the absence of externalities, equilibrium with a monopoly will be Pareto efficient if the firm can price discriminate. The equilibrium can be implemented by a 2-part tariff.
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
1078.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999.
"Clubs and the Market,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
Other versions:
Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999.
"Clubs and the Market,"
Discussion Papers
99-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Jean Tirole, 2000.
"Corporate Governance,"
CEI Working Paper Series
2000-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[Downloadable!]
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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