This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Edward Simpson Prescott
Robert M. Townsend
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We incorporate multiagent, principal-agent theory into general equilibrium analysis. The traded commodities are multiagent contracts that include a description of the individual's job, effort level, and state-contingent consumption. These contracts are club goods. The competitive equilibrium and the Pareto program are formulated. The contracts are identified with firms, so the market determines which firms exist and who is assigned to which firm in what capacity. An example is provided in which the internal organization of firms and the distribution of firm classes vary with the aggregate capital endowment and its distribution across agents. A simplex-based algorithm for solving the Pareto program is developed.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy .
Volume (Year): 114 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 644-671
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:114:y:2006:i:4:p:644-671Contact details of provider: Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Fax: (773) 753-0811 Email: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/home.html
Order Information: Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/order1.html
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984.
"Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Itoh Hideshi, 1993.
"Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981.
"Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cole, Harold Linh, 1989.
"General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information: Comment ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 249-52, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999.
"Clubs and the Market ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
Other versions: Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971.
"Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Tjalling C. Koopmans & Martin J. Beckmann, 1955.
"Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
4, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 1992.
"Wealth Effects ,"
Discussion Papers
1024, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984.
"General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-20, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andreas Hornstein & Edward C. Prescott, 1989.
"The firm and the plant in general equilibrium theory ,"
Staff Report
126, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[Downloadable!]
Cole, Harold L. & Prescott, Edward C., 1997.
"Valuation Equilibrium with Clubs ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 19-39, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1991.
"Cooperation versus Competition in Agency ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 248-83, Fall.
TIROLE, Jean, 1991.
"Collusion and the Theory of Organizations ,"
IDEI Working Papers
9, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991.
"Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2004.
"Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm ,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control ,
Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 777-800, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sherwin Rosen, 1982.
"Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993.
"Occupational Choice and the Process of Development ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Sattinger, Michael, 1993.
"Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 831-80, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984.
"Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
James A. Mirrlees, 1976.
"The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984.
"Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Alexander Karaivanov, 2002.
"Computing Moral Hazard Programs With Lotteries Using Matlab ,"
Computational Economics
0201001, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2005.
"Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm ,"
Working Papers
1078, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Alexander Karaivanov, 2003.
"Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice ,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2003
25, Society for Computational Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Robert M. Townsend & Jacob Yaron, 2001.
"The credit risk-contingency system of an Asian development bank ,"
Economic Perspectives ,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 31-48.
[Downloadable!]
Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2005.
"Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information : technical appendix ,"
Working Paper
05-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
[Downloadable!]
Joon Song, 2007.
"Futures Market: Contractual Arrangement to Restrain Moral Hazard in Teams ,"
Economics Discussion Papers
633, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2002.
"Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Redistributions with Scarcity of Capital ,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
788, Groupe HEC.
[Downloadable!]
CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2001.
"Occupational Choice, incentives and wealth distribution ,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
720, Groupe HEC.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Archishman Chakraborty & Alessandro Citanna, .
"Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution ,"
GSIA Working Papers
225, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
Chakraborty, Archishman & Citanna, Alessandro, 2005.
"Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 206-224, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service .
This page was last updated on 2008-4-27.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .