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General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information: Comment

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  • Cole, Harold Linh

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 30 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 249-52

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:30:y:1989:i:1:p:249-52

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Cited by:
  1. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2000. "Decentralizing Incentive Efficient Allocations of Economies with Adverse Selection," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0855, Econometric Society.
  2. Joon Song, 2012. "Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 163-189, September.
  3. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2006. "Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 485-516, June.
  4. Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2006. "Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(4), pages 644-671, August.
  5. Prescott, Edward & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries," Working Papers 02-08, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  6. Alberto Bennardo & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Competitive occupational choices with endogenous health risks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000199, David K. Levine.
  7. Bennardo, Alberto & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2005. "Competitive Markets with Endogenous Health Risks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Edward S. Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78.

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