1. Sevin Yeltekin, 1998. "Dynamic Principal-Multiple Agent Contracts," Computational Economics 9807001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
2. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Edward S. Prescott, 1998. "Computing moral-hazard problems using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm," Working Paper 98-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
4. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1998. "Deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act: the experience to date," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 2-20. [Downloadable!]
5. Hansen, Gary D., 1985. "Indivisible labor and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 309-327, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Robert Avery & Patricia Beeson & Paul Calem, 1997. "Using HMDA Data as a Regulatory Screen for Fair Lending Compliance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 9-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Cole, Harold Linh, 1989. "General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information: Comment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 249-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2000. "Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 216-246, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1998. "Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 98/14, Department of Economics, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
10. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "A pre-commitment approach to capital requirements for market risk," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 552-562.
11. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 2507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 344-362, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Rogerson, Richard, 1988. "Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-16, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "A pre-commitment approach to capital requirements for market risk," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
14. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Ronald A. Dye, 1986. "Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 339-350, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Dixit, Avinash & Besley, Timothy, 1997. " James Mirrlees' Contributions to the Theory of Information and Incentives," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 99(2), pages 207-35, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Ron J. Feldman & Arthur J. Rolnick, 1998. "Fixing FDICIA: a plan to address the too-big-to-fail problem," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Mar, pages 2-22.
19. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.

Cited by:
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1. Prescott, Edward & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries," Working Papers 02-08, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Prescott, Edward C. & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 1-10, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Alexander Karaivanov, 2003. "Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 25, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved action and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper Series WP-02-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
   • David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-Contingent Bank Regulation With Unobserved Actionas And Unobserved Characteristics," Working Papers wp2004_0407, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
   • Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100. [Downloadable!]
5. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jorge Aseff & Manuel Santos, 2005. "Stock options and managerial optimal contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 813-837, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Alexander Karaivanov, 2002. "Computing Moral Hazard Programs With Lotteries Using Matlab," Computational Economics 0201001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
7. Gwenael Piaser, 2005. "Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
8. Rodolfo Apreda, 2001. "The Brokerage of Asymmetric Information," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 190, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
9. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)