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A primer on moral-hazard models

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  • Edward S. Prescott

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its journal Economic Quarterly.

Volume (Year): (1999)
Issue (Month): Win ()
Pages: 47-78

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:1999:i:win:p:47-78

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Related research

Keywords: Bank supervision;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Dixit, Avinash & Besley, Timothy, 1997. " James Mirrlees' Contributions to the Theory of Information and Incentives," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 207-35, June.
  2. Cole, Harold Linh, 1989. "General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information: Comment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 249-52, February.
  3. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  4. Richard Rogerson, 2010. "Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 250, David K. Levine.
  5. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "A pre-commitment approach to capital requirements for market risk," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  6. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  7. Eskander Alvi, 1997. "First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems: A Generalization," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(1), pages 59-65, June.
  8. Robert Avery & Patricia Beeson & Paul Calem, 1997. "Using HMDA Data as a Regulatory Screen for Fair Lending Compliance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 9-42, February.
  9. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
  10. Ron J. Feldman & Arthur J. Rolnick, 1998. "Fixing FDICIA: a plan to address the too-big-to-fail problem," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Mar, pages 2-22.
  11. Gary Hansen, 2010. "Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle," Levine's Working Paper Archive 233, David K. Levine.
  12. Phelan, Christopher & Townsend, Robert M, 1991. "Computing Multi-period, Information-Constrained Optima," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 853-81, October.
  13. Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 344-362, Autumn.
  14. Ronald A. Dye, 1986. "Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 339-350, Autumn.
  15. Sevin Yeltekin, 1998. "Dynamic Principal-Multiple Agent Contracts," Computational Economics 9807001, EconWPA.
  16. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
  17. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September.
  18. Edward S. Prescott, 1998. "Computing moral-hazard problems using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm," Working Paper 98-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  19. Andreas Lehnert, 1998. "Asset pooling, credit rationing, and growth," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-52, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  20. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2000. "Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 216-246, April.
  21. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November.
  22. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1998. "Deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act: the experience to date," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 2-20.
  23. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  2. Jorge Aseff & Manuel Santos, 2005. "Stock options and managerial optimal contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 813-837, November.
  3. Richter, Francisca G.-C. & Diaz, Edgar F. Pebe & Brorsen, B. Wade & Currier, Kevin, 2003. "Using Both Sociological And Economic Incentives To Reduce Moral Hazard," 2003 Annual Meeting, February 1-5, 2003, Mobile, Alabama 35009, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
  4. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100.
  5. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  6. Prescott, Edward C. & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 1-10, November.
  7. Alexander Karaivanov, 2003. "Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 25, Society for Computational Economics.
  8. Dobeli, Barbara & Vanini, Paolo, 2004. "An analysis of IMF-induced moral hazard," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(12), pages 2933-2956, December.
  9. Gwenael Piaser, 2005. "Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6.
  10. Alexander Karaivanov, 2002. "Computing Moral Hazard Programs With Lotteries Using Matlab," Computational Economics 0201001, EconWPA.
  11. Pandey, Vivek & Shanoyan, Aleksan & Ross, Brent, 2010. "Governance Issues in the Principal-Agent Framework: Producing Cellulosic Ethanol in Michigan," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61362, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  12. Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2004. "Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 777-800, January.
  13. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:11:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Rodolfo Apreda, 2001. "The Brokerage of Asymmetric Information," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 190, Universidad del CEMA.

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