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The Dynamics of the Management-Shareholder Conflict

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Author Info
Fluck, Zsuzsanna
Abstract

This article investigates the distribution of equity ownership between entrenched management and dispersed outsiders when management has the ability to manipulate the cash flows and when it is costly for equity holders to prove managerial wrongdoing in court. Management chooses the distribution of equity ownership so as to maximize private benefits against the risk of potential control challenges. When shareholders are long-term oriented, then outside shares trade at a premium over the value to management, and management is inclined to sell off its equity stake to dispersed outsiders. When shareholders are short-term oriented, then outside shares trade at a discount below their value to management, and disciplinary pressure can be substantially reduced via strategic share purchases. Changes in the cost of capital drive a wedge between entrenched management's and dispersed outsider's valuation of shares. Management exercises its option to buy (sell) shares when the option is in the money: when management values shares more (less) than outsiders do. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 12 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 379-404
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:12:y:1999:i:2:p:379-404

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  1. Alexandra Groß-Schuler & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Sunk Costs, Managerial Incentives and Firm Productivity," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 70(2), pages 275-287.
  2. Fluck, Zsuzsanna & Mayer, Colin, 2005. "Race to the Top or Bottom? Corporate Governance, Freedom of Reincorporation and Competition in Law," CEPR Discussion Papers 5133, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Safieddine Bouali, 2002. "The Hunt Hypothesis and the Dividend policy of the firm. The Chaotic Motion of the Profits," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 316, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Love, Inessa, 2002. "Investor protection, ownership, and the cost of capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2834, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-23.


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