IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/391749000000000536.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?

Author

Listed:
  • Ernst Maug
  • Bilge Yilmaz

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000536, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:391749000000000536
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4391749000000000536.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 221-254, February.
    2. Van Wesep, Edward D., 2014. "The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism and shareholder power," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 90-108.
    3. Olaru, Ioan & Zachariadis, Konstantinos, 2011. "Trading and voting in distressed firms," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119076, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Berliant, Marcus & Tabuchi, Takatoshi, 2011. "Local politics and economic geography," MPRA Paper 28120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2007. "Corporate Control and the Stock Market," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 60, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    6. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2020. "Blockholder voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 695-717.
    7. Büchel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia & Wagner, Alexander F., 2023. "When Do Proxy Advisors Improve Corporate Decisions?," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277704, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Nicolae STEF, 2013. "Severity of the Voting Rules in Bankruptcy," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2013-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    9. Rydqvist, Kristian & Maug, Ernst, 2004. "Do Shareholders vote Strategically? Evidence on the Advisory Role of Annual General Meetings," CEPR Discussion Papers 4192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2004. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Game Theory and Information 0412006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Iaryczower, Matias, 2007. "Strategic voting in sequential committees," Working Papers 1275, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    12. Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2014. "Voting in small committees," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 69-95, February.
    13. Marcus Berliant & Takatoshi Tabuchi, 2014. "Local Politics And Economic Geography: Information Aggregation And Polarization," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 806-827, November.
    14. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
    15. Stef Nicolae, 2017. "Voting Rules in Bankruptcy Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-39, March.
    16. Maug, Ernst & Rydqvist, Kristian, 2007. "Do shareholders vote strategically? Voting behavior, proposals screening, and majority rules," Papers 07-35, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    17. Ross Hickey, 2013. "Bicameral bargaining and federation formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 217-241, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:391749000000000536. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.