Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result
AbstractWhen the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of the preferred alternatives of voters is (are) indeed the majority (Condorcet) winner(s). This important result of Duncan Black (1958) has been crucial in the development of public economics and political economy, even if it only provides a sufficient condition. Yet, there are many examples in the literature of environments where voting equilibria exist and alternative versions of the median voter results are satisfied while single peakedness does not hold. Some of them correspond to instances where other relevant conditions, apparently not connected with single eakedness, are satisfied. For example preferences may satisfy the single-crossing property (Mirrlees, 1971, Gans and Smart, 1996, and Milgrom and Shannon, 1994), intermediateness (Grandmont, 1978) or order restriction (Rothstein, 1990). Still other interesting cases of existence of voting equilibria do not fall in any of these categories. We present a new and weak domain restriction which encompasses all the above mentioned ones, llows for new cases, still guarantees the existence of Condorcet winners and preserves a version of the median voter result. We illustrate how this new condition, that we call top monotonicity, arises naturally in different economic contexts.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2008-9.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Plaza del Ejido s/n 29071, Málaga
Web page: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/METC.html
More information through EDIRC
Single peaked; single crossing and intermediate preferences; majority (Condorcet) winners;
Other versions of this item:
- Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo, 2011. "Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 345-359.
- Salvador Barberà & Bernardo Moreno, 2010. "Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result," Working Papers 297, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2008-05-17 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stiglitz, J. E., 1974. "The demand for education in public and private school systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 349-385, November.
- Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991.
"Monotone Comparative Statics,"
11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, 06.
- Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November.
- Miguel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2011. "A characterization of the single-peaked domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 305-322, February.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
- Mridu Prabal Goswami, 2013. "Non Fixed-Price Trading Rules In Single-Crossing Classical Exchange Economies," Working Papers 1311, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2012.
"Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1446-76, June.
- Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs," NBER Working Papers 14239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov & Daron Acemoglu, 2008. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs," 2008 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Robert Bredereck & Jiehua Chen & Gerhard Woeginger, 2013. "A characterization of the single-crossing domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 989-998, October.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2012.
"Majority relation and median representative ordering,"
Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 95-109, March.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2011. "Majority relation and median representative ordering," PSE Working Papers halshs-00581310, HAL.
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00581310 is not listed on IDEAS
- Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system," MPRA Paper 50696, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Feb 2011.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Samuel Danthine).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.