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Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision

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Author Info
Sen, Amartya
Pattanaik, Prasanta K.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 1 (1969)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 178-202
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:1:y:1969:i:2:p:178-202

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  1. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1979. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox," MPRA Paper 8495, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 1981. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alfonso D'errico, 1994. "Una funzione ordinale di benessere sociale," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 19-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kevin Roberts, 2005. "Social Choice Theory and the Informational Basis Approach," Economics Series Working Papers 247, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Kaushik Basu, 2007. "Coercion, contract and the limits of the market," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 559-579, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller, 1977. "Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures," Discussion Papers 234, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 512.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Jon Fraenkel & Bernard Grofman, 2004. "A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 487-506, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Salvador Barberà & Bernardo Moreno, 2008. "Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result," Working Papers 2008-9, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center. [Downloadable!]
  9. Robert E. Goodin & Christian List, 2004. "Unique Virtues of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem," Public Economics 0409010, EconWPA, revised 22 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  11. Storcken, Ton, 2008. "Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  12. Kotaro Suzumura, 2001. "Introduction Hondbook of Social Choice and Welfare Edited by Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland," Discussion Paper Series a417, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Maurice Salles (CREM-CNRS), 2006. "La théorie du choix social : de l'importance des mathématiques," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200617, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS. [Downloadable!]
  14. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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