Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system

Contents:

Author Info

  • Islam, Jamal
  • Mohajan, Haradhan
  • Moolio, Pahlaj

Abstract

The median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economics, and is widely used to study interactions between them. The median voter is the person in the middle of the distribution on the single dimension and is a more accurate predictor of decision outcomes under simple majority voting system. Politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. Median voting model has such imperfections less than the other models and an attempt has been taken to explore these in some details. Although the median voting model plays a pioneer role in modern democracy but it can not solve all the problems of voting system, and the paper deals where the median voter theorem fails.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50696/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 50696.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2010
Date of revision: 22 Feb 2011
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Economics and Research 6.2(2011): pp. 111-125
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50696

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Median voter; Single-peakedness; Single-crossing and Top monotonicity.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting," MPRA Paper 50854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2010.
  2. repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Salvador Barberà & Bernardo Moreno, 2010. "Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result," Working Papers 297, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Mathias Risse, 2005. "Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 95-113, October.
  5. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
  6. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2006. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 363-383, April.
  7. Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
  8. Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 339-346, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50696. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.