Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system
AbstractThe median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economics, and is widely used to study interactions between them. The median voter is the person in the middle of the distribution on the single dimension and is a more accurate predictor of decision outcomes under simple majority voting system. Politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. Median voting model has such imperfections less than the other models and an attempt has been taken to explore these in some details. Although the median voting model plays a pioneer role in modern democracy but it can not solve all the problems of voting system, and the paper deals where the median voter theorem fails.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 50696.
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2010
Date of revision: 22 Feb 2011
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Economics and Research 6.2(2011): pp. 111-125
Median voter; Single-peakedness; Single-crossing and Top monotonicity.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C3 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables
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