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Order-restricted preferences and strategy-proof social choices rules

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Author Info
Alejandro Saporiti
Fernando Tohmé

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File URL: http://www.cema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/191.pdf
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Paper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 191.

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Date of creation: Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:191

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

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  1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1993. "Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 429-444, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ, 1999. "Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 321-336. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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