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Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution

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Author Info
Rainald Borck

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Abstract

This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 503.

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Length: 25 p.
Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published in: Journal of Economic Surveys 21 (2007) No. 1, 90-109
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp503

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Related research
Keywords: Inequality Redistribution Voting

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roland Benabou, 2000. "Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 96-129, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  5. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Galasso, Vincenzo, 2003. "Redistribution and fairness: a note," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 885-892, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Francisco Rodriguez, 1999. "Inequality, Redistribution and Rent-Seeking," Electronic Working Papers 99-006, University of Maryland, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Rainald Borck, 2003. "Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 329, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  13. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 25-45, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Branko Milanovic, 2003. "The median voter hypothesis, income inequality and income," HEW 0305001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  18. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2003. "Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 545-572, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Rainald Borck, 2003. "On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy Are Correlated," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 369, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Borck, Rainald, 2002. " Jurisdiction Size, Political Participation, and the Allocation of Resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 251-63, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  26. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. "Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 651-668, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Philip Nel, 2006. "When Can the Rabble Redistribute? Democratization and Income Distribution in Low- and Middle-income Countries," Working Papers 43, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. [Downloadable!]
  2. John Creedy & Solmaz Moslehi, 2007. "The Optimal Composition of Government Expenditure," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1008, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Creedy, 2007. "Choosing The Tax Rate in a Linear Income Tax Structure: An Introduction," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1006, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  4. John Creedy & Solmaz Moslehi, 2007. "Modelling the Composition of Government Expenditure in Democracies," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1007, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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