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An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations

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E. Kalai
D. Schmeidler

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/191.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 191.

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Date of creation: Dec 1975
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:191

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  1. Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Caepr Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Elena Inarra & Jeroen Kuipers & Norma Olaizola, 2002. "Absorbing Sets in Coalitional Systems," BILTOKI 200201, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística). [Downloadable!]
  3. Kóczy,László Á. & Lauwers,Luc, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Research Memoranda 018, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Working Papers _001, University of Chicago, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Elena Iñarra & Concepción Larrea & Ana I. Saracho, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK 200304, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I. [Downloadable!]
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