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Transitive supermajority rule relations

Author

Listed:
  • Riste Gjorgjiev

    (University de Girona)

  • Dimitrios Xefteris

    (University of Cyprus)

Abstract

This paper identifies necessary and sufficient single-profile conditions for a consistent decision under a supermajority rule. It is demonstrated that a preference profile generates a transitive supermajority rule relation if and only if it is not sufficiently balanced. These conditions link transitivity of a supermajority rule to the cardinal outcomes of plurality and anti-plurality elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Riste Gjorgjiev & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Transitive supermajority rule relations," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 299-312, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0060-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0060-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
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    5. Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo, 2011. "Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 345-359.
    6. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2012. "A necessary and sufficient single-profile condition for transitivity of the majority rule relation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 516-518.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "Consistent Linear Orders for Supermajority Rules," Papers 2304.09419, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Supermajority; Transitivity; Reduced population; $$a$$ a -balancedness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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