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A simple characterization of majority rule

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Author Info

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA)

  • Donald E. Campbell

    ()
    (Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA)

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    Abstract

    Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity. This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskin's, dispenses with another, and contains weak versions of his other two axioms. It allows the number of voters to be odd or even.

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    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/0015003/00150689.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 689-700

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:3:p:689-700

    Note: Received: December 23, 1998; revised version: May 10, 1999
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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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    Related research

    Keywords: IIA; Majority; Pareto; Single-peaked; Transitivity.;

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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2011. "Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 272-273, March.
    2. Remzi Sanver, M., 2006. "Nash implementation of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 369-372, June.
    3. Merrill, Lauren Nicole, 2011. "Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 259-261, September.
    4. J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
    5. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2013. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 10-12.
    6. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
    7. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
    8. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
    9. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2010. "The necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the Majority Rule in the linear domain," MPRA Paper 24588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. McMorris, F.R. & Powers, R.C., 2013. "Majority decision on median semilattices," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 48-51.
    11. Marchant, Thierry, 2007. "An axiomatic characterization of different majority concepts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 160-173, May.
    12. Yi, Jianxin, 2005. "A complete characterization of majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 109-112, April.
    13. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhong, Zhen, 2010. "Single profile of preferences with variable societies: A characterization of simple majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 119-121, May.
    14. Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
    15. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2011. "Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 143-149, March.
    16. Núñez Matias & Valleta Giacomo, 2012. "The informational simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    17. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2005. "More on the majority rule: Profiles, societies, and responsiveness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 7-11, July.
    18. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2012. "A necessary and sufficient single-profile condition for transitivity of the majority rule relation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 516-518.
    19. Antonio Quesada, 2013. "The majority rule with a chairman," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 679-691, March.
    20. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.

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